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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-3186 
____________ 
 
FRANK SUAREZ, 
                                Appellant 
v. 
 
CITY OF BAYONNE; TIMOTHY CAREY, Individually;  
STEVEN RHODES, Individually; 
JOHN DOES 1-8 (fictitious names, real names unknown) 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D. NJ. No. 2-10-cv-04495) 
District Judge: Faith S. Hochberg 
____________ 
 
Argued April 8, 2014 
Before:  FISHER and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges, and MARIANI,
*
 District Judge. 
 
(Filed: May 7, 2014 ) 
 
Peter J. Cresci, Esq.  ARGUED 
Cresci Law Firm 
P.O. Box 74 
830 Avenue A 
Bayonne, NJ 07002 
 
Michael S. Doran, Esq.  ARGUED 
Cammarata, Nulty & Garrigan 
                                              
*
The Honorable Robert D. Mariani, District Judge for the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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549 Summit Avenue 
Jersey City, NJ 07306 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff-Appellant Frank Suarez appeals the order of the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey granting summary judgment to Defendant-Appellees 
Detectives Timothy Carey and Steven Rhodes (collectively, “the Detectives”) and the 
City of Bayonne, New Jersey (“the City,” and with the Detectives, “Appellees”).  We will 
reverse in part and affirm in part. 
I. 
A. 
 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 Responding to an anonymous tip that drug dealing was occurring in the vicinity, 
the Detectives, joined by Detective Wayne Grapstul, approached an address on East 11th 
Street in Bayonne on the evening of April 29, 2010.  The parties dispute what happened 
when they arrived. 
 Suarez testified at his deposition that he was sitting on the steps of a house when 
the Detectives “pulled up[,] jumped out of their car and just started hitting” him.  A340.  
He testified that the Detectives were in an unmarked police vehicle, that they did not 
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identify themselves as police, and that he did not flee from them.  He testified that each 
Detective hit him about four times, that they tackled him to the ground and handcuffed 
him, and then continued to hit him.  He identified his sole injury from this encounter as a 
scrape to his head that did not bleed.  A witness named John Klumpp testified that he saw 
Suarez lying handcuffed on the ground while being punched and kicked by the 
Detectives.  Another witness, Karen Koepke, testified that she saw Suarez run but that 
she could not see whether the police assaulted him because cars obstructed her view. 
 The Detectives dispute this characterization of the incident at East 11th Street.  
Rhodes testified that as they approached the address, he recognized Suarez from past 
encounters with police and “locked eyes” on him.  A400.  According to Rhodes, at that 
point Suarez removed a small bag of marijuana from his waistband, dropped it on the 
ground, and took off running east on 11th Street.  Carey testified that he identified 
himself as a police officer and gave chase, tackling Suarez a short distance away.  Rhodes 
stayed with the marijuana, which Grapstul collected. 
 Officer Chester Konopka responded to the incident and arrived on-scene at 6:04 
p.m.  Konopka placed Suarez in his patrol car a few minutes later and drove him to police 
headquarters, where Suarez was searched and placed in a holding cell.  It appears from 
the record that Suarez was never read his Miranda rights.  About thirty to forty minutes 
later, Suarez was taken to an office used by the narcotics group, where Rhodes told him 
that he would be searched again.  The two sides once again diverge as to what happened 
next. 
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 Suarez testified that when he got to the office, Rhodes told him to remove his 
shoes and his pants but did not remove his handcuffs, which bound his hands behind his 
back.  Suarez claims that he was able to partially remove his pants despite being 
handcuffed, and that once he had done so Rhodes punched him in the nose, breaking it.  
He claims that Rhodes and Carey hit his body and head two more times each.  He also 
claims they called him a racial epithet, and testified that he did not resist the search, 
attempt to fight back, or kick either officer. 
 The Detectives testified differently.  They do not dispute that they took Suarez to 
the office for a second search, but the Detectives claim that they removed his handcuffs 
when he arrived at the office.  Rhodes testified that Suarez resisted his efforts to perform 
a search, “became irate,” and then “pushed [Rhodes], took a fighting stance and kicked 
[him] in the genital area” while still wearing his boots.  A407.  Rhodes claims that he 
then punched Suarez once in the face in self-defense, which caused Suarez to bleed from 
the nose.  Rhodes claims to have hit Suarez only once, and asserts that Carey did not hit 
him at all.   
 After the scuffle at police headquarters, Suarez was taken to Bayonne Medical 
Center, where he was triaged at 7:03 p.m.  He was diagnosed with a broken nose and skin 
abrasions to his arm.  Hospital records indicate that Suarez described his pain as mild.  
Suarez was given ibuprofen and discharged into police custody.  Suarez filed a complaint 
with the Bayonne Police Department Internal Affairs Unit alleging that the Detectives 
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engaged in an excessive use of force.  After Suarez failed to appear for an interview in 
connection with his complaint, Internal Affairs deemed the Detectives exonerated.  
 Suarez was charged with a variety of offenses.  In December 2012, he pleaded 
guilty in New Jersey municipal court to simple assault of Rhodes, and the remainder of 
the charges were dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement.  At his plea hearing, the 
following colloquy occurred: 
Q: Mr. Suarez, I draw your attention to April 29, 2010.  Do you recall being 
in the City of Bayonne on that date? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And were you arrested by an officer, Detective Rhodes? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And during that arrest, did you strike him and cause him pain? 
A: Yes. 
A540.  The court and Suarez then clarified that the assault occurred at the police 
headquarters, not on the street.   
B. 
 Suarez filed a three-count complaint on September 1, 2010, naming as defendants 
Carey, Rhodes, and the City.  He brought claims against the detectives for unreasonable 
seizure, use of excessive force, and denial of medical care for injuries suffered while in 
custody.  He alleged a municipal liability claim against the City.   
 On March 14, 2012, the District Court stayed proceedings in this case pending the 
outcome of the criminal charges against Suarez.  Once he pleaded guilty, the District 
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Court dissolved the stay.  Appellees moved for summary judgment on all counts, which 
the District Court granted.  This timely appeal followed. 
II.
1
 
 “On an appeal from a grant or denial of summary judgment, our review is plenary 
and we apply the same test the district court should have utilized initially.”  Giles v. 
Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009).  A district court shall grant a motion for  
summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  A fact is “material” if it “„might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 
law.‟”  In re Lemington Home for Aged, 659 F.3d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).  For a factual dispute to be 
genuine, “„all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual 
dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties‟ differing versions of the 
truth at trial.‟”  Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49).   
III. 
A. 
 The District Court held that Suarez‟s excessive force and unreasonable seizure 
claims amounted to a collateral attack on his simple assault conviction, and were 
                                              
1
 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction over the District Court‟s final order granting summary 
judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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therefore barred by the Supreme Court‟s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 
(1994).  We disagree. 
 The Supreme Court held in Heck that a plaintiff may not maintain a claim under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 if success on such a claim would imply the invalidity of the plaintiff‟s 
criminal conviction, unless the conviction has already been reversed on appeal, 
invalidated through collateral proceedings, or expunged by executive order.  Id. at 486-
87.  The reason for this rule “is to avoid parallel litigation of probable cause and guilt” as 
well as to “prevent[] the claimant from succeeding in a tort action after having been 
convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution, which would run counter to the judicial 
policy against creating two conflicting resolutions arising from the same transaction.”    
Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 484).  We 
have recognized that Heck does not automatically bar a § 1983 claim for excessive force 
against an officer even though the plaintiff was convicted of resisting arrest (or, as here, 
simple assault) based on the same interaction with police.  Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 
142, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1997).  This is so because law enforcement officers can “effectuate[] 
a lawful arrest in an unlawful manner.”  Id. 
 It is important to separate, for purposes of our Heck analysis, Suarez‟s arrest on 
East 11th Street and the fracas at police headquarters.  The District Court concluded that 
the East 11th Street incident “began the chain of events leading to [Suarez‟s] guilty plea 
for simple assault on Detective Rhodes,” and therefore a verdict in Suarez‟s favor would 
undermine his conviction.  A9.  We disagree with this conclusion.  If a jury were to credit 
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Suarez‟s version of the East 11th Street incident, that would not imply the invalidity of 
his simple assault conviction based on the incident at police headquarters.    Under New 
Jersey law, Suarez would have been entitled to resist an unlawful use of force by the 
Detectives, but such a right would have dissipated once he had been taken into custody 
and the excessive use of force abated.  See State v. Mulvihill, 270 A.2d 277, 280 (N.J. 
1970) (holding that a citizen “cannot use greater force in protecting himself against the 
officer‟s unlawful force than reasonably appears to be necessary. If he employs such 
greater force, then he becomes the aggressor and forfeits the right to claim self-defense to 
a charge of assault and battery on the officer”).  Even if the Detectives employed 
excessive force on East 11th Street, Suarez‟s right to resist would have expired by the 
time he was searched at police headquarters, and therefore he would still be guilty of 
simple assault.  Hence, the claim is not barred by Heck. 
 The analysis is a bit more subtle with respect to the tussle at headquarters.  Suarez 
pleaded guilty to kicking Rhodes in the groin while undergoing the second search.  To the 
extent that Suarez claims either: (1) that he did not kick Rhodes at all and he was beaten 
wholly without provocation; or (2) that he used a reasonable amount of force when he 
kicked Rhodes after Rhodes attacked him, his claim is barred by Heck.  With respect to 
the former, the reason is that such a theory would undermine the factual basis for his 
guilty plea insofar as he admitted to kicking Rhodes at his change of plea hearing.  With 
respect to the latter, by pleading guilty to the criminal offense of simple assault, Suarez 
has conceded that he did not use reasonable force when he kicked Rhodes in response to 
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an excessive and unreasonable use of force.  See Mulvihill, 270 A.2d at 279 (“If . . . the 
officer employs excessive and unnecessary force, the citizen may respond or counter with 
the use of reasonable force to protect himself, and if in so doing the officer is injured no 
criminal offense has been committed.”).   
 He testified at his deposition, however, that Carey hit him at least twice, on his 
head and in his ribs, and that Rhodes hit him more than once.  A344.  Suarez did not 
plead guilty to any conduct relating to Detective Carey, and thus if the jury were to credit 
Suarez‟s testimony and find that Carey used excessive force in restraining him, his 
conviction for assaulting Rhodes would not be undermined.  Similarly, if the jury found 
that Rhodes continued to beat Suarez beyond the point necessary to secure him after his 
brief resistance, the jury could return a verdict in Suarez‟s favor without undermining his 
assault conviction. 
 We conclude that the District Court erred in holding that Suarez‟s excessive force 
and unreasonable seizure claims are barred by Heck, and we will accordingly reverse the 
District Court‟s grant of summary judgment to the Detectives on these claims. 
B. 
 The District Court offered as alternative bases for granting summary judgment on 
Suarez‟s excessive force and unreasonable seizure claims: (1) that Suarez had failed to 
raise a genuine dispute of material fact on these claims; and (2) the Detectives were 
entitled to qualified immunity.  Both alternative holdings were limited to Suarez‟s claims 
as they relate to the East 11th Street incident; the District Court relied wholly on its Heck 
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analysis with respect to Suarez‟s claims as they relate to the incident at police 
headquarters.  We will reverse on both grounds. 
 A police officer‟s “use of force contravenes the Fourth Amendment if it is 
excessive under objective standards of reasonableness.”  Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 
133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)).  We have 
described a variety of factors that are relevant to determining whether an officer‟s use of 
force is objectively reasonable, including: 
the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate 
threat to the safety of the officer or others, . . . whether he is actively 
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight[,] . . . the duration of 
the [officer‟s] action, whether the action takes place in the context of 
effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and the 
number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time. 
Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496-97 (3d Cir. 2006) (final alteration in original; 
internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuinely disputed 
issues of material fact.  When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a district court 
“„may not . . . weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations‟ because „these 
tasks are left for the fact finder.‟”  Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 
2011) (quoting Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 386 (3d Cir. 2008)).  The District 
Court‟s grant of summary judgment amounted to a determination that Suarez‟s deposition 
testimony was not credible and that the evidence in the Detectives‟ favor outweighed that 
in favor of Suarez, two determinations that it was not permitted to make at summary 
judgment.  It relied on the deposition testimony of Rhodes and Carey that Suarez fled and 
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resisted arrest, and Koepke‟s testimony that Suarez ran from the Detectives, which it 
incorrectly credited as “the sworn testimony of his own mother.”  A9.  It further 
disregarded Suarez‟s claim that the Detectives kicked and punched him unnecessarily by 
observing that his “only injury from the East 11th Street encounter was a scratch on his 
head.”  Id.  But Suarez‟s testimony contradicts the Detectives‟ narrative.  He claims that 
the Detectives assaulted him without warning or provocation, and that he did not resist or 
flee from them.  He testified that he was punched and kicked in the head, ribs, and back 
about four times by each Detective, that he was handcuffed and then hit again.  Were a 
jury to credit Suarez‟s testimony, they could reasonably find that the Detectives 
employed excessive force in light of the factors we have enunciated.  Whether Suarez‟s 
testimony is worthy of credence is a question for the jury, not for the District Court on 
summary judgment.   
 The District Court‟s ruling on qualified immunity was likewise in error.  
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the 
official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time 
of the challenged conduct.”  Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012).  As we 
have discussed, a material factual dispute exists as to whether the Detectives violated 
Suarez‟s right to be free from the use of excessive force and from unreasonable seizure.  
With respect to the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity question, “[t]he 
factors relevant to the excessive force analysis are well-recognized.”  Couden, 446 F.3d 
at 497.  Were the jury to credit Suarez‟s testimony, that finding would support the 
12 
 
conclusion that the Detectives used excessive force under clearly established law.  
Accordingly, the District Court erred in concluding that the Detectives are entitled to 
qualified immunity. 
C. 
 The District Court granted summary judgment to the Detectives on Suarez‟s 
failure to provide medical treatment claim.  We will affirm. 
 In order to prevail on his failure to provide medical treatment claim, Suarez must 
show that: (1) the Detectives were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs; and (2) 
his medical needs were serious.  Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).  “Deliberate indifference may be 
shown by „intentionally denying or delaying medical care.‟”  Kearney, 571 F.3d at 330 
(quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104).  If a prisoner is subjected to an “„unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain . . . as a consequence of denial or delay in the provision of 
adequate medical care,‟” that may rise to the level of a failure to treat a serious medical 
need.  Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2003) (some internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 
347 (3d Cir. 1987)).   
 The District Court correctly determined that Suarez failed to raise a genuine 
dispute of material fact in support of his failure to provide medical treatment claim.  With 
respect to the East 11th Street incident, Suarez failed to identify any injury that would 
qualify as a “serious medical need.”  Rather, the only injury he claims to have suffered as 
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a result of that incident was a scrape to his left temple that did not bleed, and for which 
there is no evidence that he requested medical treatment.  Nor is there evidence that 
Suarez suffered an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” due to a failure to treat 
this minor abrasion.  With respect to the injuries he sustained from the scuffle at police 
headquarters, Suarez has no evidence that the Detectives intentionally denied or delayed 
his access to medical care.  He was taken to the Emergency Department at Bayonne 
Medical Center immediately following the kerfuffle.  Suarez claims that it took the 
officers between forty-five minutes and an hour to arrive at the hospital, but elsewhere he 
testified that he sat in a holding cell at police headquarters for about half an hour before 
being taken to the narcotics room where the incident occurred.  Suarez was taken into 
custody a few minutes after 6:00 p.m. and was triaged at Bayonne Hospital at 7:03 p.m.  
At most, he waited between thirty minutes and an hour before arriving at the hospital.  
Once there, he informed hospital staff that his injuries “hurt [a] little bit.” A134.  He was 
diagnosed with a nasal fracture and skin abrasions to his arm, given 600 milligrams of 
ibuprofen, and was discharged to police custody.  There is simply no evidence that 
Suarez was subjected to an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” due to a 
deliberate failure to provide him with medical treatment.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
District Court‟s grant of summary judgment on this claim. 
D. 
 The District Court granted summary judgment to the City on Suarez‟s municipal 
liability claim because it had previously found that there was no underlying constitutional 
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violation.  This was error, for reasons we have discussed.  However, it held in the 
alternative that even assuming the presence of a constitutional injury, Suarez had 
“adduced absolutely no evidence beyond mere legal conclusory language” that his injury 
was the result of a policy or custom of the City.  A12.  We agree and will affirm on this 
basis. 
 A municipality may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “„only . . . when the 
alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, regulation or 
decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by custom.‟”  
Mulholland v. Gov’t of the Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996)).  For Suarez to establish the 
City‟s liability for either an unconstitutional policy or custom, “[i]t is clear . . . [that he] 
„must show that an official who has the power to make policy is responsible for either the 
affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled custom.‟”  Watson 
v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 
F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
 Suarez‟s municipal liability claim boils down to three allegations: (1) that the City 
has a custom and practice of allowing officers to use excessive force; (2) that the City 
fails to properly investigate internal affairs complaints; and (3) that the City fails to 
properly train its officers in the use of force and the performance of Terry stops.  He has 
failed to adduce evidence in support of any of these theories.  With respect to his claim 
that the City has a custom or policy of allowing police officers “to head bang citizens 
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without recourse,” Appellants‟ Br. at 40, Suarez lists in his brief several lawsuits that he 
claims show a custom of tolerance for such misbehavior.  But he has failed to provide 
any evidence regarding the factual bases of these lawsuits or what their outcomes were.  
Nor has he provided any evidence whatsoever that the incidents giving rise to these 
lawsuits (assuming that they presented meritorious claims) derived from a custom or 
policy of the City to condone the use of excessive force.  Similarly, Suarez‟s vague 
allegations that the City fails to properly investigate internal affairs complaints are 
supported by no evidence of such a policy or custom.  Finally, with respect to his failure 
to train theory, Suarez‟s only evidence is deposition testimony that he has misconstrued 
in an attempt to manufacture a factual dispute.
2
   
 We agree with the District Court that Suarez has failed to raise a genuine dispute 
of material fact with respect to his municipal liability claim, and we will affirm its grant 
of summary judgment to the City. 
                                              
2
 For example, Suarez claims that “[n]either individual Defendant knew what a Terry stop 
was in their vast experience,” Appellants‟ Br. at 37, citing only the following deposition 
testimony as support: 
 
Q: Detective Rhodes, do you know what a Terry stop is? Have you ever  heard 
of the term a Terry stop, T-e-r-r-y? 
A. No. I heard of a Terry search. 
Q: What is your understanding of a Terry search? 
A: It‟s a search of the outer garments of the individual.  
 
A411; cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (allowing a police officer, in appropriate 
circumstances, to “conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing . . . in an 
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault” the officer).  The rest of 
Suarez‟s evidence purporting to show the City‟s failure to train is similarly disingenuous 
and equally unavailing. 
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IV. 
 For the reasons discussed, we will reverse the District Court‟s order insofar as it 
granted summary judgment to the Detectives on Suarez‟s excessive force and 
unreasonable seizure claims, and remand for trial on these claims.  We affirm in all other 
respects. 
 
